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Using a hazards framework and panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (1979-2004), we analyze the fertility patterns of a recent cohort of white 
and black women in the United States. We examine how completed fertility varies by 
women’s education, differentiating between intended and unintended births. We find 
that the education gradient on fertility comes largely from unintended childbearing, 
and it is not explained by child-bearing desires or opportunity costs, the two most 
common explanations in previous research. Less-educated women want no more chil-
dren than the more educated, so this factor explains none of their higher completed 
fertility. Less-educated women have lower wages, but wages have little of the negative 
effect on fertility predicted by economic theories of opportunity cost. We propose 
three other potential mechanisms linking low education and unintended childbearing, 
focusing on access to contraception and abortion, relational and economic uncer-
tainty, and consistency in the behaviors necessary to avoid unintended pregnancies. 
Our work highlights the need to incorporate these mechanisms into future research.
In recent decades, education differences in the timing and partnership context of 
fertility have widened. College graduates have postponed childbearing, while 
less-educated women continue to have their first birth at relatively young ages 
(Rindfuss, Morgan and Offutt 1996). At the same time, all groups of women 
have postponed marriage. Combined with greater union instability among the less 
educated, this has led to growing disparities in single parenthood (Ellwood and 
Jencks 2004). Recent literature on U.S. fertility has focused so intently on timing 
and context that the question of social class or education differences in completed 
fertility has been eclipsed. We return attention to this topic.
U.S. socioeconomic differences in levels of fertility are longstanding, with the 
poor and less educated generally having more children (Blake 1968; Freedman, 
Whelpton and Campbell 1959). In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars and policy mak-
ers were concerned about high fertility and the problems of overpopulation. Many 
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saw technological innovation and access to effective contraception as key to reduc-
ing unintended pregnancy and driving down fertility, particularly among those 
with relatively large families (Ryder 1973b; Westoff 1972; Westoff and Bankole 
1996). Indeed, with the diffusion of the birth control pill, the incidence of unin-
tended pregnancy in the United States declined in the 1960s and 1970s (Pratt et 
al. 1984), and fertility dropped to about replacement. But the diffusion did little 
to level socioeconomic differences in fertility (Sweet and Rindfuss 1983). Further, 
while all education groups experienced declines in unintended pregnancies up 
until the 1990s, this decline reversed in the mid-1990s for poor and less-educated 
women, increasing the education gradient on unintended fertility (Boonstra et al. 
2006; Finer and Henshaw 2006). As of the mid-1990s, age-specific fertility rates 
were such that a woman with a high school degree or less would be expected to 
have 2.1 children in her life, while college graduates would have 1.6 (Yang and 
Morgan 2003). The gradient on unintended fertility is steeper, with a much higher 
proportion of unintended pregnancies to women with low education, and a lower 
proportion of the unintended pregnancies resolved with abortion. In 2001, 40 
percent of births to women with less than a high school education and 10 percent 
of those to college graduates were unintended (Finer and Henshaw 2006).
The dominant account of education differences in fertility focuses on op-
portunity costs; women who can earn higher wages are more strongly motivated 
to limit their fertility because the income they forego for any time taken out of 
employment for childrearing is greater. A second, cultural view posits that hav-
ing children is more socially valued in lower classes, in part because alternative 
sources of meaning are so scarce (Edin and Kefalas 2005). Both of these views 
appear more relevant in explaining why women have intended births, but they 
may also bear on unintended fertility. Given large – and growing – education 
differences in unintended fertility, we set out to better understand differences in 
the separate components of intended and unintended births. We assess the extent 
to which education differences can be explained by opportunity costs and values, 
using longitudinal data that span the reproductive lives of a recent cohort of 
U.S. women. Women’s education is correlated with their parents’ education and 
income, with their own occupational status and earnings, and with the education 
and earnings of their partners. Thus it can be seen, broadly, as an indicator of 
“class” or SES in a heterodox formulation. Our analysis, however, concerns only 
effects of education, with select models assessing the role of wage in mediating 
the education-fertility relationship. 
Our analysis is the first to examine how education affects both intended and 
unintended fertility within a multivariate hazard framework. It is also novel in 
directly examining the extent to which education differentials in completed (in-
tended and unintended) fertility are explained by differences in women’s wage 
rates or the number of children they want. To foreshadow, we will find that educa-
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and that these differentials are not explained by either wage rates or number 
of children wanted. In discussing our results, we draw on diverse literatures to 
propose three potential explanations for an education gradient in unintended 
childbearing, focusing on differences in access to contraception and abortion, 
instability in relationships and economic circumstances, and consistency in the 
behaviors necessary to avoid unintended pregnancies, or efficacy. 
Past Theory and Research
Opportunity Costs
Among economists, the dominant perspective linking education or other measures 
of earning power to fertility is sometimes called the Columbia-Chicago cost-of-
time view (Becker 1981; Hotz, Klerman and Willis 1997; Mincer 1963; Pollak 
and Watkins 1993). In this view, women decide between alternative uses of their 
time – in childrearing or market work. The higher their potential wage, the higher 
the opportunity cost of having a child, assuming they will reduce employment 
for childrearing. Women with higher potential wages will choose fewer children 
because the “price” of any hours of employment foregone to engage in childcare 
is greater for those who can earn more.   
Of course, well educated women typically marry better educated husbands 
(Schwartz and Mare 2005). In the economic view, men’s income increases fertil-
ity, just as it increases the purchase of many consumer durables, because it makes 
having children more affordable (Becker 1960). Indeed, in theory, either men’s or 
women’s earning power could have a negative opportunity cost effect (also called a 
“price effect” by economists) or a positive “income effect” on fertility (Macunovich 
1996). However, to the extent that women do most of the child-rearing work that 
involves a reduction of market labor supply, the income effect of men’s and the 
opportunity cost effect of women’s earnings are expected to dominate.  
Given the centrality of the price-of-time perspective, there is surprisingly little 
direct empirical evidence from the United States to support it. Schultz (1994) 
used 1980 U.S. Census data and showed that women’s predicted wage (based 
on education, demographic and state policy variables) had a negative effect on 
number of children. An earlier time series analysis for 1948-1975 showed that 
net effects of women’s average wages on fertility were negative, an effect that was 
stronger when the female employment rate was higher, while men’s average wages 
had a net positive effect on fertility (Butz and Ward 1979). Using a similar method 
with data from 1964-1994, Macunovich (1996) found a negative effect of average 
female wage on fertility early in the period, but a positive effect in more recent 
years. She concludes that income effects may now dominate the price effects of 
women’s earnings. Surveying the evidence, Heckman and Walker (1990) conclude 
that “the main question – do wages and incomes matter? – is still open.”1546  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
Values – How Many Children are Desired
Demographers have largely been silent on whether education differences in desired 
family size might explain education differences in fertility. The exception is Judith 
Blake, a dissenter to the view that contraceptive technology and access drive fertil-
ity trends and differentials (Blake 1967; Blake and Das Gupta 1975). She argued 
for the importance of motivation to have a certain number of children, yet the 
survey data she assembled from the 1930s through the 1960s suggested that social 
classes differed little in the number of children they wanted, with the exception 
that those at the very bottom wanted slightly more (Blake 1967). 
Using rich, qualitative interviews, Edin and Kefalas (2005) argue that, compared 
to their middle-class counterparts, low-income women place a higher value on 
having children. They rely in part on the opportunity cost view, pointing out that 
the jobs poor women might forego for childbearing pay little anyhow. But they 
also argue that lower class women place a higher absolute value on children, not 
merely a higher value relative to their other options (Edin and Kefalas 2005). They 
recount poignant testimonials from their sample of poor, unmarried mothers who 
saw children as the greatest source of meaning in their lives. They further cite survey 
data (Sayer, Wright and Edin 2003) showing that those with low education are 
dramatically more likely to say that people without children live “meaningless lives.” 
Lower education is also correlated with more traditional gender role beliefs, which 
might be expected to encourage fertility (Kane 1995; Kiecolt and Acock 1988). 
Education Differences in Unintended Fertility 
The contraceptive revolution has brought the United States nowhere near abolish-
ing unintended pregnancy (Boonstra et al. 2006; Finer and Henshaw 2006). To 
assess whether pregnancies were intended, demographers generally use survey 
questions that classify pregnancies as unintended if women say that, at the time 
they conceived, they never wanted to become pregnant again, or that they wanted 
to become pregnant at some point in the future, but not yet. The first is called 
“unwanted” and the second “mistimed,” and both are seen as unintended. This clas-
sification scheme is imperfect, ignoring the possibility of a continuum with shades 
of ambivalence in the middle (Bachrach and Newcomer 1999; Edin et al. 2007), 
and ignoring men’s views, but it does allow us to compare educational subgroups. 
As noted, recent data show large and increasing differences by education and 
income in unintended fertility (Boonstra et al. 2006; Finer and Henshaw 2006). 
At a proximate level, these disparities arise from less consistent and effective con-
traception (or abortion) by those with less education and income, even when they 
are not trying to get pregnant (Boonstra et al. 2006; Brown and Eisenberg 1995; 
Silverman, Torres and Forrest 1987). But studies on this topic are based largely 
on bivariate associations, so the less proximate mechanisms remain mysterious. At 
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of education differences based on opportunity cost and values, as these emphasize 
women’s motivations in getting pregnant. That is, in a rational choice framework, 
either preferences (child-bearing desires) or pecuniary incentives (based on oppor-
tunity cost) should affect whether one wants a pregnancy, and thus affect decisions 
about whether or not to have unprotected sex, practice contraception or abort. 
Indeed, economists interpret behavior as “revealed preferences.” Yet, insofar as 
contraception and abortion have monetary and psychic costs, those whose values 
or opportunity costs give them only weak motivation to avoid childbirth may not 
be as vigilant about birth control, leading to some unintended pregnancies as well 
(Hotz et al. 1997; Miller 1986). Thus we expect values and opportunity costs to 
have some effect on unintended fertility, but we expect both to have larger effects 
on intended than unintended fertility. 
Research Strategy and Hypotheses
We rely on longitudinal data rich in individual characteristics and changes in char-
acteristics over time, allowing us to directly test two key explanations of education 
differences in completed fertility: the value women place on children and oppor-
tunity costs. If education affects fertility through values, then we would expect to 
find that a young woman’s desired number of children accounts for some of the 
education/fertility relationship. If the lower fertility of more educated women is 
because of their higher earning potential (hence, higher opportunity cost of time 
spent in childrearing), then we would expect wages to explain the education/
fertility relationship. Overall, we expect education differences in child-bearing 
desires and opportunity costs to operate on intended and unintended fertility, but 
especially on intended.
We derive estimates of completed cohort fertility by education from discrete-
time multinomial hazard models of intended, mistimed and unwanted births. 
Our models include births of all parities and incorporate interactions between age 
and education to account for the older age schedule of childbearing among more 
highly educated women (Martin 2000; Rindfuss, Morgan and Offutt 1996). All 
analyses are run separately for white and black women because both the timing 
and number of births vary by race (Morgan 1996; Yang and Morgan 2003). 
Data and Methods
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
We use the NLSY79, a national probability sample of individuals born from 1957 
through 1964 and living in the United States in 1979 (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2006). The sample includes just under 4,000 white and black women 
ages 14-21 in 1979.2 Interviews were conducted every year from 1979 to 1994 and 
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were 39-46, or 42 years old on average. Personal interviews were conducted in all 
survey years except 1987, in which a limited phone interview was done. Attempts 
were made each year to interview all sample members, regardless of whether they 
missed prior surveys. Retention rates for the NLSY79 have been relatively high. 
They exceeded 90 percent through the early 1990s and were 77 percent in 2004. 
Sample weights are used to adjust for differential attrition over time.
Measures
Intended and Unintended Fertility
Birth histories provide dates of birth for all children born to each respondent. 
Key to our analysis, the NLSY79 also includes information about the intention 
status of each pregnancy, based on a series of questions pertaining to contracep-
tive use and feelings at the time of pregnancy. Women are first asked whether 
they were contracepting at the time they became pregnant and, if not, whether 
it was because they wanted to become pregnant. They are then asked: “Just 
before you became pregnant the (first, second, third, etc.) time, did you want to 
become pregnant when you did?” Births are intended if a woman reported not 
using contraception because she wanted to get pregnant or said, irrespective of 
contraceptive use, that she wanted to get pregnant or felt indifferent about get-
ting pregnant at that time. Births are mistimed if a woman said she did not want 
a(nother) baby at the time she got pregnant, but did want a(nother) baby at some 
time in the future,3 and they are unwanted if she said she did not want a(nother) 
baby at any time in the future. Although the quality of retrospective reports of 
pregnancy intendedness has been debated (Ryder 1973; Trussell, Vaughan and 
Stanford 1999; Westoff and Bankole 1996; Williams, Abma and Piccinino 1999), 
there is ample evidence of its validity. For example, a high proportion of couples 
who report wanting no more children choose sterilization soon after their last 
wanted birth (Bumpass 1987). Also, reported birth intendedness is associated 
with child outcomes later in life (Barber et al. 1999; Baydar 1995; Brown and 
Eisenberg 1995; Crissey 2005; but see Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman 2000). 
In an analysis using multiple controls and sibling fixed effects, Barber and East 
(2009) show that while the effects of a mistimed birth on child outcomes are 
smaller than those of an unwanted birth, both have negative effects, suggesting 
that the joint category of “unintended” has some utility.
In the NLSY79, questions about pregnancy intentions are generally asked over 
a one- or two-year interval.4 We were unable to match pregnancy intentions to 
8 percent of recorded births (due to either item nonresponse on the intended-
ness questions or missing reports on pregnancies corresponding to birth dates 
in the fertility history). Missing information on intention status is fairly evenly 
distributed across education groups. In descriptive tabulations, we allocate missing 
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proportions intended, mistimed and unwanted. We exclude these births from our 
hazard analyses. We model one birth per year, and thus further exclude all but 
the first birth to occur in any year of age (resulting in a loss of 1 percent of births 
in our sample). Finally, to allow for lagged predictors in our models, we exclude 
births prior to 1981, meaning that we exclude all births to women under age 16 
(another 1 percent of births in our sample). 
Explanatory Variables
In descriptive tabulations, we rely on years of final completed education, as mea-
sured at the last survey. Years of education are categorized into four groups: less 
than 12, 12, 13-15 and 16 or more. For normative schooling transitions, these 
correspond to high school drop out, high school graduate, some college and col-
lege graduate, respectively, and we will typically refer to them as such. In the early 
years of the survey, when many women are still in school, observed education 
may be a poor indicator of educational prospects. We therefore use time-varying 
predicted years of final completed education in our main analyses, which better 
capture the effects of a young woman’s educational plans on whether she has a 
child at a young age. As births may truncate educational experiences, the idea 
is to create a measure of education that will allow us to examine the effects of 
education on births without incorporating the effects of births on education. 
Predicted values are lagged two years from the time a birth is assessed to ensure 
that they precede conception. They are generated by regressing final completed 
years of schooling on completed education to date; school enrollment; educa-
tional expectations at first interview; the Arms Forces Qualifying Test, a measure 
of cognitive ability or skill level administered in 1981; and family background, 
including mother’s and father’s education, parental income in 1979 and family 
structure at age 14.5 Regressions are run separately by five-year age groups and race, 
and thus are fully interacted along these dimensions. Quantitative predictions are 
categorized to correspond to less than high school (<12), high school (12-12.99), 
some college (13-15.99), and college (16+). Despite the richness of the data, the 
possibility remains that the estimated effects of (predicted) education are subjected 
to omitted variable bias, reflecting in part other characteristics of women not in 
our models that cause both their educational attainment and their tendency to 
have unplanned births.
Our measure of child-bearing desires comes from a question asked in 1979, 
in the first year of the survey: “How many children do you want to have?” 
Respondents were in their late adolescence, on average, at the time of the question. 
For most, this question was asked prior to first birth.6 Distinct from child-bearing 
ideals or expectations, this item comes closest to tapping unconstrained fertility 
preferences.
The most direct indicator of opportunity cost is the cost of one’s time, or hourly 
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hourly wage in 2004 dollars. In models including current wage, we also control 
for whether the respondent is currently in paid employment (wages are set to the 
mean for those not employed for pay).7 Wages and employment (like education) 
are time-varying and lagged two years. Although wages may be seen as the most 
direct measure of opportunity cost, they may be a poor indicator of long-term 
economic potential (e.g., Xie et al. 2003). We thus examine an alternative measure, 
which is the natural log of the running average of past wage observations (in 
constant 2004 dollars). This smoothes out fluctuations in wages and (arguably) 
provides a better indicator of long-term potential. When we include this indica-
tor in our models, we control for the proportion of all years a woman has spent 
in paid employment since the start of the survey and flag the cases with no paid 
work experience.
In addition to these key variables, all models control for school enrollment. 
Some models include time-varying and lagged indicators of marital status and the 
natural log of spouse employment income. Specifically, these variables are used to 
test the sensitivity of our results to the potentially confounding effects of spouse 
income on the relationship between fertility and own wage. Descriptive statistics 
of explanatory variables are shown in Appendix Table 1.
Discrete-Time Hazard Models
We examine the education gradient on fertility in a discrete-time hazard frame-
work, which allows us to incorporate influences of multiple explanatory variables 
that vary over time. We use multinomial logistic regression to examine the relative 
risks of an intended, mistimed, or unwanted birth of any order, at a given age, 
relative to having no birth. Suppressing individual subscripts, our full model can 
be written:
log [Pj(t)/(1 – PJ(t))] = α1j + α2jage(t) + α3jage2(t) + β1jEd(t-2) + 
γ1jEd(t-2) x age(t) + γ2jEd(t-2) x age2(t) + β2jEnrollment(t-2) +       (1)
  β3jDesires +  β4jln(Wages)(t-2) + β5jEmployment(t-2)
where the logit or log odds of a birth is an additive function of covariates, j indexes 
births according to intention status, and t indexes person-years of age from 16-
46. The parameters α1j to α3j represent the baseline hazard, or the value of the log 
odds of a birth of intention status j at age t when all other covariates are zero. β1j 
is a vector of coefficients for the main effect of predicted education, indicated by 
high school, some college, and college dummies, all relative to less than a high 
school degree. The γ1j and γ2j are vectors of coefficients for the interactions between 
education dummies and age and age-squared; these allow education’s effect on 
fertility to vary by age, accounting for the older ages at which more educated 
women, and in particular, college graduates, have their children. The β2j to β5j 
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and employment, respectively. Child-bearing desires are measured only once, at 
the time of first survey, but all other substantive predictors vary over time and are 
lagged two years from the assessment of a birth.
A simple transformation of the logit (equation 1) makes it possible to estimate 
the probability of a birth of intention status j at age t: 
Pj(t) = 1/(1 + e-logit)                  (2)
Applying this transformation and filling in parameter estimates from our mod-
els, we generate age-specific probabilities of intended, mistimed and unwanted 
childbearing. We sum these probabilities over ages 16-46 to generate a measure of 
completed cohort fertility by intention status j,8 which can be written:
CCFj = 
  
Pj(t)
t=16
46
∑
                   
(3)
Sample
We include all person-years in which there is information on births, intention status 
and explanatory variables. For example, if sample members drop out of the survey 
for a year or more but re-enter, we include all person-years for which there is data. 
When data are incomplete, we either exclude the affected interval (this is always 
the case when birth intention status is missing) or use a simple imputation strategy 
to fill in the gaps. In years in which the survey is not administered (odd years 
1994-2004) and in cases of noninterview and item nonresponse, we impute miss-
ing values on time-varying explanatory variables by assigning values from the past 
year.9 Because complete, retrospective fertility histories are collected (including on 
birth intention status), this method allows us to retain most of the off-survey years.
As noted, time-varying explanatory variables are lagged two years from the 
interval in which a birth is assessed to ensure that their measurement precedes 
conception. We left-censor births prior to 1981 to allow for this lag, and conse-
quently begin our analysis of births at age 16 (the youngest respondents are 14 in 
1979, and thus 16 in 1981). Left censoring does not bias our results, although it 
may affect the precision of estimates for the youngest age groups, where sample 
sizes are relatively small.10
There are 2,543 white and 1,446 black women in our initial sample. We ex-
clude a small number of cases (N = 26) due to missing values on child-bearing 
desires. We construct a person-year-of-age file for 3,963 individuals with data 
spanning 1981-2004, yielding 95,112 records. We drop 611 person-years due to 
missing information on the planning status of births. We censor 8,375 person-
years due to attrition from the survey and 9,545 due to missing information on 
time-varying variables, leaving a final sample of 76,581 person-years (48,930 for 
whites and 27,651 for blacks). Overall, 3,934 women contribute an average of 
19.5 years exposure and a total of 4,939 births.552  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
Results
Table 1 shows the average number of intended, mistimed and unwanted births 
to white and black women in 2004, at the last year of the survey. Recall that 
respondents are 39-46 years old at last interview, i.e., at or very near the end of 
their child-bearing years. These are thus reasonable estimates of completed child-
bearing for this cohort. The first column of Table 1 shows average fertility levels 
pooled across education groups. As is well documented (Yang and Morgan 2003), 
whites have lower overall fertility than blacks, although neither group is far from 
replacement level, with whites averaging 1.85 children per woman and blacks, 
2.18. The share of all births that are unintended differs by race, with 23 percent 
(i.e., .42/1.85) mistimed and 4 percent unwanted among whites, compared to 38 
percent and 18 percent, respectively, among blacks.
Columns 2-5 (Table 1) show average completed fertility by years of com-
pleted education in 2004; the final column shows the ratio of total fertility for 
the lowest to highest education group, providing a measure of the education 
gradient on fertility. Summing over all births, white high school dropouts have 
1.28 times as many children as their college-educated peers, and black high 
school dropouts have 2.22 times as many. This overall fertility gradient, how-
ever, masks substantial variation by the intention status of births. For both race 
groups, the education gradient on fertility increases substantially for mistimed 
and unwanted births, relative to intended births. Indeed, white high school 
dropouts have virtually the same number of intended births as college graduates, 
but they have 2.39 times as many mistimed and 3.30 times as many unwanted 
births. For blacks, the ratios for high school dropouts compared to college 
graduates are 1.49, 2.39 and 6.24 for intended, mistimed and unwanted births, 
Table 1: Observed Completed Fertility by Education
All
, High 
School
High 
School
Some  
College College
Ratio of , High 
School to College
Whites
Intended births 1.36 1.38 1.36 1.35 1.34 1.03
Mistimed births .42 .56 .55 .43 .23 2.39
Unwanted births .08 .13 .10 .07 .04 3.30
Total births 1.85 2.06 2.01 1.86 1.61 1.28
N 2,029 123 819 490 597
Blacks
Intended births .94 1.27 .96 .86 .85 1.49
Mistimed births .83 1.15 .93 .78 .48 2.39
Unwanted births .40 .84 .41 .39 .14 6.24
Total births 2.18 3.26 2.30 2.04 1.47 2.22
N 1,197 116 504 391 186
Notes: Means are weighted and Ns are unweighted. Sample includes women at last 
interview, in 2004, ages 39-46. Missing data on birth intention status is imputed based on 
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respectively. Clearly, education differences in fertility are driven largely by dif-
ferences in unintended childbearing.
Next we examine education gradients in a multivariate framework.  All subse-
quent analyses rely on our measure of predicted ultimate education. Table 2 reports 
estimates of total intended, mistimed and unwanted births by education derived 
from our multinomial hazard models. These are obtained by generating age-specific 
predicted birth probabilities from model coefficients for each of our four educa-
Table 2: Predicted Completed Fertility by Education
, High 
School
High 
School
Some  
College College
Ratio of , High 
School to College
Whites
Model 1
Intended births 1.07 1.24 1.15 1.25 .86
Mistimed births .62 .46 .39 .21 3.02
Unwanted births .19 .08 .07 .03 6.68
Total births 1.88 1.78 1.60 1.48 1.27
Model 2: Model 1 + Desires
Intended births 1.08 1.24 1.14 1.24 .87
Mistimed births .63 .46 .39 .20 3.07
Unwanted births .18 .08 .07 .03 6.52
Total births 1.89 1.78 1.59 1.47 1.29
Model 3: Model 2 + Wage
Intended births 1.12 1.28 1.14 1.17 .96
Mistimed births .55 .43 .38 .21 2.55
Unwanted births .16 .08 .07 .03 5.43
Total births 1.83 1.78 1.58 1.41 1.29
Blacks
Model 1
Intended births 1.03 .76 .73 .76 1.36
Mistimed births .80 .85 .69 .47 1.69
Unwanted births .56 .29 .34 .08 7.33
Total births 2.39 1.90 1.75 1.31 1.83
Model 2: Model 1 + Desires
Intended births 1.05 .77 .72 .74 1.42
Mistimed births .82 .86 .68 .47 1.75
Unwanted births .55 .29 .34 .08 7.15
Total births 2.42 1.92 1.74 1.28 1.88
Model 3: Model 2 + Wage
Intended births 1.10 .80 .73 .71 1.56
Mistimed births .74 .80 .66 .48 1.54
Unwanted births .48 .28 .34 .08 5.77
Total births 2.32 1.88 1.74 1.27 1.83
Notes: Predictions are derived from (weighted) multinomial logistic regression models. 
Total fertility is estimated as the sum of age-specific predicted birth probabilities varying 
education while holding all other predictors at their weighted mean values. Model 
1 includes age, age-squared, age by predicted education interactions and school 
enrollment; Model 2 adds child-bearing desires; Model 3 adds ln of current wage and 
employment status.554  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
tion groups, holding all other variables at their (weighted) mean values, and then 
summing birth probabilities from age 16 to 46.11 Model 1 is our most basic model, 
which includes a quadratic function of age, predicted education, predicted educa-
tion by age and age-squared, and school enrollment status. Model 2 adds the 
respondent’s early report of her desired fertility, and Model 3 adds our most direct 
indicator of opportunity cost, hourly wage. Results for whites and blacks are shown 
separately, and the complete models are reported in Appendix Table 2.
Model 1 serves as a baseline estimate of the association between education and 
fertility. The education gradient derived from our model (as measured by the ratio 
of total fertility for the least to highest educated) is less than one on intended births 
to white women. That is, white college graduates are predicted to have somewhat 
higher completed intended fertility than their less-educated peers. White high 
school dropouts are predicted to have 3.02 times as many mistimed births and 
6.68 times as many unwanted births as white college graduates. Results are similar 
for blacks, although the education gradient is always greater than one, i.e., high 
school dropouts have higher fertility than college graduates, irrespective of inten-
tion status: 1.36 times as many intended, 1.69 times as many mistimed, and 7.33 
times as many unwanted.
Model 2 additionally controls for fertility desires, measured in the first year of 
the survey. If education differences in fertility desires were an important source 
of the education/fertility gradient, we should see a lessened education gradient 
after desires are controlled. But Model 2 (Table 2) shows that the differentials are 
virtually identical with and without controlling for fertility desires. The reason that 
early child-bearing desires do not explain any of the education gradient on fertil-
ity is that, despite the fact that desires are modestly related to fertility (Appendix 
Table 2), they are hardly correlated with education. For all education groups and 
both races, the median and modal desire is two children. What education differ-
ences there are in desires show college graduates wanting somewhat more children 
(Appendix Table 1a). Those white women who go on to be college graduates 
initially desired an average of 2.61 children, compared to 2.40 among those who 
drop out of high school; the analogous numbers for blacks are 2.68 for those who 
become college graduates and 2.02 for those who drop out of high school.
 Model 3 adds indicators of opportunity cost. Our most straightforward mea-
sure of opportunity cost is the natural log of the respondent’s hourly wage two 
survey years before the hazard of a birth is assessed. Because women who are 
not employed have no wage, we set their wage to the mean and control for paid 
employment status. We examine change in the education gradient that results 
from adding these labor force variables to assess whether education differences 
in fertility arise from the way education affects the opportunity cost to women 
(and their families) of any time they take out of the labor market for childrearing. 
If wages deter fertility, the education gradient on predicted fertility derived from 
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expect to see a reduction in the ratio of fertility of the bottom to the top education 
group. In fact, we find no change in the education gradient for whites (the ratio 
of completed fertility for white high school dropouts to college graduates remains 
constant at 1.29 across models 2 and 3), and we find a very small decline for blacks 
(the ratio decreases from 1.88 to 1.83).
Why do wages fail to explain the education gradient on fertility? Of course 
wages vary by education, but they are, surprisingly, only weakly associated with 
fertility. Model 3 estimates in Appendix Table 2 reveal that wage coefficients are 
not always statistically significant, nor are they consistently negative, as predicted 
by economic theories of opportunity cost. Indeed, under a rational choice model, 
the negative effect of women’s wages should be largest on intended fertility, but 
here we find positive associations. We explore the relationship between fertility and 
wages in greater detail in Table 3. This table shows the predicted value of fertility, 
varying wages under alternative model specifications. To generate predictions, 
we hold education constant at the level of high school graduation and set school 
enrollment, child-bearing desires and employment status to their weighted mean 
values. The first set of results is based on Model 3 (which uses current wage to 
measure opportunity costs). Among whites, increasing wages from the 25th to the 
75th percentile increases intended fertility by an estimated .14 births (from 1.22 to 
1.36). Wage effects on intended fertility among blacks are in the same direction 
and are of a similar magnitude, but miss statistical significance. Higher wages are 
associated with reduced unintended fertility, although changes are statistically 
significant only in the case of black mistimed fertility, with an increase from the 
25th to the 75th percentile of wage reducing mistimed fertility by .09 births. In 
all cases, the ratio of fertility at the 25th percentile of wage to fertility at the 75th 
percentile of wage is close to one.
Next we performed sensitivity tests to see if alternative procedures would sup-
port predictions about opportunity costs. In Model 4 (Table 3), we include the 
same labor force variables as Model 3, i.e., current wage and employment status, 
but we also control for marital status and spouse employment income (all lagged 
by two years). Women with high earnings tend to marry men with high earnings 
and, in economic theory, men’s wages are presumed to have an income effect, 
whereas women’s are thought to have a price effect. Thus, without controlling 
for spouse income, we might mask any true effect of women’s wage on fertility. 
Results based on Model 4 suggest that this is not the case. Women’s own wages 
have little effect, whether or not we control spouse income.12 Controlling spouse 
income, we find the same small, positive coefficients of own wage on intended fer-
tility (statistically significant for whites) and negative coefficients on unintended 
fertility (statistically significant for black mistimed births).
Of course, wages fluctuate, and women’s current wages may be imperfect pre-
dictors of their future wages, particularly if more education gives women access 
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wage trajectories. We thus try another sensitivity test, based on the idea that an 
average wage across past years in which the woman worked may be a better indica-
tor of her potential wage. Instead of current wage, Model 5 (Table 3) includes the 
natural log of average past wage (in constant dollars) for all years. And instead of 
Table 3: Predicted Completed Fertility by Wages
Intended Mistimed Unwanted
Whites
Model 3: Model 2 + Current Wage
25th percentile wage ($7.85) 1.22 .44 .08
75th percentile wage ($14.30) 1.36 .41 .08
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .90 1.07 1.05
Model 4: Model 3 + Spouse Income
25th percentile wage ($7.85) 1.26 .46 .08
75th percentile wage ($14.30) 1.43 .44 .08
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .88 1.06 1.05
Model 5: Model 2 + Average Past Wage
25th percentile wage ($6.11) 1.22 .44 .08
75th percentile wage ($10.70) 1.35 .44 .07
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .91 1.01 1.09
Model 6: Model 5 + Spouse Income
25th percentile wage ($6.11) 1.27 .47 .08
75th percentile wage ($10.70) 1.40 .47 .07
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .90 1.00 1.10
Blacks
Model 3: Model 2 + Current Wage
25th percentile wage ($6.88) .77 .85 .29
75th percentile wage ($11.36) .84 .76 .27
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .91 1.12 1.08
Model 4: Model 3 + Spouse Income
25th percentile wage ($6.88) .79 .85 .27
75th percentile wage ($11.36) .86 .75 .26
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .92 1.12 1.07
Model 5: Model 2 + Average Past Wage
25th percentile wage ($5.90) .77 .88 .27
75th percentile wage ($8.94) .80 .84 .27
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .97 1.04 1.00
Model 6: Model 5 + Spouse Income
25th percentile wage ($5.90) .79 .87 .26
75th percentile wage ($8.94) .81 .84 .26
Ratio of 25th to 75th percentile .98 1.05 .99
Notes: Predictions are derived from (weighted) multinomial logistic regression models. 
Total fertility is estimated as the sum of age-specific predicted birth probabilities varying 
wages while holding education at the level of high school graduation and all other 
predictors at their weighted mean values. Model 2 includes age, age-squared, age by 
predicted education interactions, school enrollment and child-bearing desires; Model 
3 adds ln of current wage and employment status; Model 4 adds marital status and ln 
of spouse income. Starting again with Model 2, Model 5 adds ln of average past wage, 
proportion years employed, and whether never employed; Model 6 adds marital status 
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current employment, we control for the proportion of all past survey years that 
the respondent reports a wage and flag cases with no paid work experience (as in 
previous models, labor force indicators are lagged two years). Here again, we see 
little change in predicted fertility varying average past wage from the 25th to the 
75th percentile and holding all other variables constant. Average past wage has the 
same estimated positive effect on white intended fertility as current wage; none 
of the other changes (for whites or blacks) are statistically significant.13 Adding 
controls for marital status and spouse income in Model 6 (Table 3) does not alter 
these findings. In sum, our results suggest that wages do little to deter fertility; 
indeed, they are very modestly, positively associated with intended fertility. As far 
as we can discern by our measures, opportunity cost does not explain the associa-
tion between education and fertility.14
We briefly comment on racial differences here, although our focus is on educa-
tion differences within racial groups. Overall, black women average higher fertility 
than white women (2.18 compared to 1.85 children). However, highlighting the 
importance of separate analyses by race, Table 1 shows that race and education 
interact, such that among the least educated women, blacks have substantially 
higher fertility than whites (3.26 vs. 2.06), whereas among college graduates the 
difference reverses, with black women averaging fewer births (1.47 vs. 1.61). The 
strong education gradient on unintended births that we emphasize here holds for 
both races, but even more strongly for blacks. The other striking race difference is 
that, within each education level, a higher proportion of black than white births 
are unintended (mistimed or unwanted, but especially the latter). These differ-
ences may reflect the large racial differences in union status across the education 
distribution; black women are much less likely to be married, and married women 
are much more likely to intend their births.
Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications
Using panel data from the NLSY79, we assessed the effect of women’s educa-
tion on whether she had no birth relative to the competing hazards of intended, 
mistimed and unwanted births. If the mother reported that at the time she 
got pregnant she wanted another child someday in the future but not right 
then, the birth was classified mistimed; if she said she never wanted another 
child, it was considered unwanted. These categories have in common that they 
are unintended at the time they occur. We wanted a measure of the effects of 
education on births not contaminated by effects of births on education. To try 
to get at this, we lagged our explanatory variables two years behind the wave 
in which the birth was reported and relied on predicted education (based on 
socioeconomic background, test scores, educational aspirations and education 
to date). Predicted education also captures the effects of a young woman’s real-
istic knowledge that she is likely to go to college on whether she has a baby in 
her early years.558  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
We find that (predicted) education is negatively associated with completed 
fertility among both black and white women. Our basic model predicts that white 
women who do not complete high school will have 1.88 children, on average, 
and those who complete college will have 1.48; for blacks, the analogous decrease 
across education categories is from 2.39 to 1.31 (Table 2, Model 1). These figures 
include intended and unintended births, and obscure the fact that what education 
mainly deters is unintended births. Indeed, our key finding is that the education 
gradient on unintended fertility, and especially on unwanted fertility, is much 
steeper than on intended fertility. The least educated white women are predicted 
to have .86 times as many intended, 3.02 times as many mistimed, and 6.68 times 
as many unwanted births as their counterparts who have graduated from college 
(Table 2, Model 1). The least educated black women are predicted to have 1.36 
times as many intended, 1.69 times as many mistimed, and 7.33 times as many 
unwanted births as their counterparts who have graduated from college (Table 
2, Model 1). In sum, the completed fertility gradient comes largely (and in the 
case of whites, entirely) from the tendency of less-educated women to have more 
unintended births.
Do Child-bearing Desires Explain Education Differences in Fertility?
We found that controlling for how many children women said they wanted at 
the first wave of the survey (when they were 14-21) does nothing to reduce the 
educational differentials. This is because less-educated women do not aspire to 
more children. At the median, all eight race-by-education groups want exactly 
two. Qualitative accounts depict children as the main source of meaning for less- 
educated women (Edin and Kefalas 2005), whereas they are one among a number 
of meaning-making projects for the better educated. Desires for children relative to 
other pursuits may explain education differences in fertility; education differences 
in early reports of how many children women want, however, do not.
Do Opportunity Costs Explain Education Differences in Fertility?
Economists argue that having a child has higher opportunity costs for well educated 
women because they have access to jobs with higher earnings, so they have more to 
lose from any scaling back of employment – whether dropping out entirely for a 
time, or reducing their hours of paid work. We noted that even the past literature, 
with its mixed results, gives us reason to doubt this explanation. Some authors 
have cautioned that the theory does not clearly predict that high wages of women 
will deter fertility because the income effect (such that earning more makes raising 
children more affordable) might override the opportunity cost effect (Macunovich 
1996), especially as purchasable substitutes for mothers’ time are more available 
(Joshi 2002). Moreover, the theory seems to apply most clearly to intended fertility, 
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Our study casts further doubt on the opportunity cost explanation of fertility 
differentials. Education does, of course, raise women’s wages. However, when we 
enter wage rate as a covariate in our hazard models, it explains little to none of 
the educational gradient on fertility (Table 2, moving from Model 2 to 3). The 
reason that wage does not explain education effects is that estimated wage effects 
on fertility are small, even if we control for husband’s employment income (and 
marital status) (Table 3). Further, these effects are positive on intended fertility, 
opposite the opportunity cost prediction. One might criticize using current wages 
to test opportunity costs; wages fluctuate a good deal for young people, while 
the opportunity cost calculations envisioned by the economic model are based 
on long-term earning power. Thus, as a sensitivity test, we created an alternative 
measure of earning power – the average of all past years’ wage rates (in constant 
dollars). This variable did no better than current wage at accounting for the educa-
tion gradient on fertility. Thus, we doubt that the higher opportunity cost faced 
by more educated women is why they are having fewer children.
What Explains the Education Differences in Unintended Fertility?
We have shown that neither wanting more children (they do not) nor lower wages 
(they are only weakly associated with fertility) explains the higher fertility of less- 
educated women, so what does? Because the higher fertility of the less educated 
comes mainly from unintended fertility, the question is really why the less educated 
have more unintended births of both the mistimed and unwanted variety. We 
propose three possibilities: socioeconomic differences in access to contraception or 
abortion, instability in relationships and economic circumstances, and efficacy. We 
call for further research to shed light on unintended fertility – one of the “persistent 
empirical puzzles” in the social demography of fertility (Bachrach et al. 2007:2).
Access to Contraception
The simplest hypothesis is that unintended fertility is higher among the less edu-
cated because they do not know about or cannot afford or access contraception 
or abortion. Those with low education and income often have no private health 
insurance,15 and while most clinics accept Medicaid and many offer sliding 
scales, many private physicians do not accept Medicaid patients (Silverman et 
al. 1987). One survey of low income, fertile, sexually active women found that 
about a quarter of those who did not want to get pregnant were nonetheless 
not contracepting. But only about 9 percent of nonusers mentioned a reason 
that could be construed as about cost or availability of services (Silverman et 
al. 1987). A recent qualitative study corroborates this; unmarried low-income 
parents were asked if they had ever been in a situation where they wanted to use 
birth control but did not because they could not afford it. None of those with 
unintended pregnancies said that money had ever been a barrier to contraceptive 
use (Edin et al. 2007).560  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
There is stronger evidence that access limits use of abortion. The political cli-
mate has become increasingly unfavorable to abortion since about 1980, just the 
period in which NLSY79 data were collected, and many women have to travel a 
considerable distance to obtain one (Boonstra et al. 2006). Medicaid has not paid 
for abortions for decades except in states that contribute their own funds for what 
the federal government will not cover as a matter of policy (Boonstra et al. 2006). 
One quasi-experimental study gained analytical leverage from the fact that North 
Carolina provided funding for abortions for poor women, but did so each year 
only until funds ran out. The study assessed whether the dates of funding cutoff, 
which varied by year, corresponded with trends in abortions and births among 
poor women, concluding that not funding abortions for poor women decreases 
abortions and increases birth (Morgan and Parnell 2002). 
Relational and Economic Uncertainty
Most demographic thinking into the 1970s assumed that childbearing largely took 
place within long-term, stable marriages, so that the two important questions were 
how children were spaced, and at what number the couple would stop. Today, the 
relationship context of childbearing is more complicated; an unintended birth, 
for example, may mean that a woman wanted a child but not with this partner 
(Zabin et al. 2000). Fertility and marriage have decoupled, with 4 in 10 births now 
to unmarried women (Hamilton, Martin, and Ventura 2009), and rates much 
higher for less-educated women. While non-marital births are often to cohabit-
ing couples, these couples have high rates of separation (England and Edin 2007; 
Wu and Musick 2008). Women with low education are increasingly less likely to 
marry (Goldstein and Kenney 2001) and more likely to divorce (Martin 2006) 
than those with higher education, and thus are now much less likely to be making 
child-bearing decisions within a continuous relationship. Increased inequality and 
the decline of men’s earnings at the bottom (Morris and Western 1999) have also 
increased the economic instability in which partnerships exist.
Recent qualitative studies suggest that this climate of economic and relational 
instability may create more ambivalence about pregnancies, leading to more 
pregnancies that are reported as unintended. Edin and Kefalas’ (2005) study, 
mentioned earlier, found that poor women see the ideal context for childbearing as 
an economically stable married couple with a house. But when neither economic 
stability nor the house seem within reach anytime in the foreseeable future, valu-
ing children greatly, they sometimes “roll the dice” and stop contraception, leading 
to conceptions that are not explicitly planned, but often welcomed. In another 
qualitative study using in-depth interviews of a subsample of unmarried couples 
from the Fragile Families survey, Edin et al. (2007) classified parents’ non-marital 
births by intendedness, finding that the more serious and stable the relationship 
was, the further the pregnancy was along the continuum from unplanned to 
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they analyzed seem to fit the mold suggested by Edin and Kefalas. Anthropologist 
Johnson-Hanks (2005) argues that people facing great uncertainty do not set 
fertility targets in the way presumed by family planning programs. The women 
in Cameroon that she studied could not tell her how many children they wanted 
because the answer depended on particular – and unpredictable – configurations 
of relationships, income, and kin support. Yet they did not act randomly; she 
characterizes their decisions as “judicious opportunism,” seizing good-enough 
opportunities for family building when they arose.
These qualitative studies suggest that the relational and economic instability 
now faced by less-educated women often creates ambivalence about the appro-
priateness of childbearing, leading at times to couples opening themselves to 
pregnancy in less than ideal circumstances. Some of these pregnancies will be 
classified as “unintended” by the usual survey methods, and, indeed, they are 
not explicitly intended, even though they may be at least ambivalently wanted at 
the time of conception. Of course, if such ambivalent pregnancies were the main 
explanation of the education gradient in births classified in surveys as unintended, 
it would call into question the measurement of intendedness that we (and other 
demographers) have used. We believe that this conclusion is premature, but call 
for more qualitative studies that probe the intentionality around conception.
Efficacy
Another possible explanation for education disparities in unintended fertility is 
that those with less education are less apt to believe that their own actions can have 
effects, and also have less of the self-regulation needed to engage in the sometimes 
onerous behaviors that further one’s long-term goals. Applied to contraception, 
these two factors lead to less consistency in contraception and more unintended 
pregnancies. Mirowsky and Ross (2007) show that those with more education 
perceive themselves to have more control over their lives. They theorize that a 
greater subjective sense of control is built up from experiences with challenges 
that one can master, more autonomous jobs, the control that having money brings 
and better health. The disadvantages of the childhood and adult circumstances of 
women with little education may mitigate against a sense of control. Perceived lack 
of control may in turn be a self-fulfilling prophesy, discouraging one to undertake 
actions that would pay off. For example, Ross and Mirowsky (2003) show that 
those with less education are less likely to engage in health-promoting behaviors 
(e.g., exercising or refraining from smoking), and that these create some of the 
education differentials in health. In the qualitative interview study of low-income, 
unmarried parents, Edin et al. (2007) concluded that about a quarter of the preg-
nancies they analyzed were cases in which there was not even an ambivalent desire 
to have a child at the time of conception, yet the couple was not contracepting; 
the authors saw these cases as indicative of lack of efficacy because behavior was 
not aligned with goals.562  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
Something akin to this explanation of education or class differentials in fertil-
ity can be found in decades-old qualitative research by Rainwater (1960), which 
found many working class and poor couples with more children than they wanted. 
Operating in an era before the birth control pill, and before sterilization became 
common, the main means of birth control were condoms and the diaphragm. 
Most people in all classes knew about available methods, and money to buy them 
was not mentioned as the limitation. Nor did opportunity costs seem a factor as 
few women thought of employment as an option unless income was desperately 
needed. But education related to consistency in the use of these contraceptives. 
Some of the education differences in contraceptive use leading to unintended 
pregnancies may be cases in which individuals do not believe they can control 
their fertility and/or are lacking the self-regulation to consistently engage in the 
hassle of contraception, even when they do not want a pregnancy.16
Implications for Public Policy
The issue of high unintended fertility concentrated among disadvantaged popula-
tions is more pronounced in the United States than other affluent nations (Brown 
and Eisenberg 1995). No doubt related to its high level of unintended childbear-
ing, the United States has a relatively high rate of early and nonunion fertility 
(Kiernan 2002; Heuveline, Timberlake and Furstenberg 2003), also concentrated 
among the disadvantaged (Ellwood and Jencks 2004). Despite the dramatic reduc-
tion in U.S. teen fertility in the 1990s and early 2000s (Hamilton, Martin and 
Ventura 2009), far from converging with other nations, there are signs that educa-
tion and income inequalities in U.S. family patterns are growing. For example, 
education differences in mother’s age at birth, divorce and single parenthood have 
widened (Martin 2006; McLanahan 2004; Raley and Bumpass 2003), as have dif-
ferences by education and income in the proportion of births that are unintended 
(Boonstra et al. 2006; Finer and Henshaw 2006).    
Several decades ago, demographers saw the high rates of unintended fertility 
in the United States and elsewhere in the context of fears about world over-
population. They envisioned that contraceptive availability could eliminate most 
unintended births and usher in zero population growth. Instead, the United 
States got to about zero population growth even while the proportion of unin-
tended births remained high, especially for those with low education (Finer and 
Henshaw 2006). Some women are having larger families than they intended. 
But, overall, U.S. women have .33 fewer births at the end of their child-bearing 
years than their stated expectations early in life (Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan 
2003). Our Table 1 shows that of all the eight race-by-education groups, only 
black women in the lowest education group have fertility appreciably above the 
replacement level of 2:1. U.S. fertility among this most recent cohort to reach 
the end of their child-bearing years would fall well below replacement without 
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Well-educated women are relatively successful at avoiding unintended fertility, 
but they often have fewer children than they wanted early in life. Our analysis 
suggests that it is not their high wages leading to their low fertility, nor does it 
seem to be a lack of stable, economically secure marriages. College graduates have 
adopted a cultural schema that demands intensive mothering (Hays 1996; Lareau 
2003), thus many wait until they are established in careers and marriages before 
having children. We suspect that it is their late start at marriage and fertility, as 
well as the difficulty they experience when trying to combine paid work and par-
enting, that leads many of them to end up with fewer children than desired. The 
lack of male participation in parenting and limited parenting accommodations 
by employers may discourage the transition to motherhood and the decision to 
have a second child. 
Women with less education are much less likely to put off childbearing and 
are more likely to have unintended pregnancies. Their fertility, however, averages 
only slightly above replacement; most women in this group are not having more 
children than they wanted, more typically, they are having them at times and in 
situations that they view as less than ideal. Our analysis casts doubt on the usual 
explanations of the fertility-education relationship. Less-educated women do 
not start out wanting more children than those who get more education, nor do 
their lower wage levels explain much of their higher unintended fertility. Since 
our analysis was unable to explain educational differentials in unintended fertility, 
we could only speculate on their causes. We have suggested three mechanisms 
that deserve further study – that lack of economic and geographical access to 
abortion is a barrier, that the difficult economic circumstances common among 
less-educated women lead them to open themselves to pregnancies that they am-
bivalently want when the right circumstances seem unlikely, and that these same 
difficult circumstances erode the sense of control and self-regulation needed for 
contraceptive efficacy when women are clear that they do not want a conception. 
Assessing the merits of these hypothesized explanations will help to inform policies 
aimed at reducing unintended fertility.
Notes
1.   These authors provide evidence that Swedish women in cohorts with higher average 
earnings have lower fertility, but they lack individual measures of earnings, thus the 
cohort effects may confound other downward cohort influences on fertility with wage 
effects, as the authors admit.
2.   This number excludes the military, poor white and Hispanic oversamples. The full 
military sample was dropped from the NLSY79 in 1985; the poor white oversample 
was dropped in 1991. Oversamples of blacks provide an adequate number of cases 
for the separate analysis of this group, but sample sizes are too limited to extend our 
analysis beyond blacks and whites. We exclude men, as we know them to misreport 
fertility, particularly non-marital fertility (Rendall et al. 1999).564  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
3.   Given this definition, pregnancies that came later than the woman wanted are not 
classified as mistimed, but rather as intended, so long as she reports that she still 
wanted to get pregnant at the time of conception. Unlike some other surveys, the 
NLSY79 does not explicitly ask if the pregnancy came too soon, about the right time 
or too late.
4.   The intendedness questions are asked first in 1982 about all prior pregnancies. 
Questions are repeated yearly from 1982 to 1986; after 1986, they are asked every 
other year. 
5.   Missing values on quantitative variables are set to the mean and flagged, and indicators 
are included for missing values on categorical predictors.
6.   About 15 percent of the sample had a child by 1979, when NLSY79 members were 
14-21 years of age, so their stated desires may have been affected by prior fertility. Our 
results were not sensitive to whether these women were included in our analyses.
7.   In all analyses of women’s wages, we set non-working women’s wages to the weighted 
mean and include a control for whether or not employed. Because of this control, the 
wage coefficient does not vary depending on the particular treatment of missing data, 
that is, by whether we replace missing data with the mean, 0, or some other value. 
The coefficient on the employment dummy used to factor out the missing cases on 
wage does change depending on what values missing scores are assigned, but we do 
not interpret the meaning of the employment coefficient.
8.   Our predictions underestimate total fertility by about 10 percent. Recall that our 
hazard analysis excludes all but the first birth per year of age (loss of 1 percent of 
births in our sample), births to women under 16 (loss of 1 percent), and births with 
missing information on intention status (loss of 8 percent).
9.   We exclude person-year observations when valid data are not available from the prior 
year, and we flag imputed values in our analyses. We impute values for 25 percent 
of the person-years; most imputations (about 20 percent) are done to fill in data for 
non-survey years. We examined various imputation strategies, and our results were 
not sensitive to the number of years we looked back to fill in missing values, nor were 
they sensitive to how imputed values were flagged.
10.  This is true at the upper tails of the age distribution, as well. Namely, while we can 
estimate age-specific birth probabilities for women up to and including 46, these 
estimates are based on fewer observations than estimates from ages that all sample 
members pass through during the survey period, i.e., 23-39.
11.  We tested an alternative method of generating predictions, setting controls to woman-
specific values, taking a weighted average of predictions across women by age and 
education group, and then summing weighted means over all ages for each education 
group. Results were similar whether we followed this approach or set controls to their 
weighted mean values, as described in the text.
12.  The estimated effect of spouse income is positive and statistically significant on 
intended births among whites and blacks (as predicted by economic theory), but it 
is not significantly related to unintended fertility (results available upon request).
13.  In results not shown, we tried another variation. We constructed a (CPI-adjusted) 
average of a woman’s wages in all survey years she was employed, including those 
after the birth. While clearly an extreme variation, the merit of the measure is that 
women who are on a steep wage trajectory (and know that early in their careers) are Education Differences in Fertility  • 565
“credited” for their higher later earnings even in their early years. Thus, if women with 
high expected earnings have fewer children because of the high anticipated rather 
than current opportunity costs, adding this measure to our regressions should have 
explained a share of the education gradient on fertility. It did not. Its estimated effect 
on intended fertility was close to zero and statistically insignificant.
14.  Another version of the opportunity cost argument is that welfare systems create 
incentives for fertility among low-educated women who qualify for assistance. The 
fact that it is unintended – not intended – fertility that declines with education makes 
this hypothesis less compelling.
15.  Future research could make use of measures of health insurance in the NLSY79 to 
test the importance of insurance to unintended births.
16.  The NLSY79 contains a measure of how much mastery individuals feel over their 
environment. In results not shown, we included this in models, and did not find it 
to mediate the education effect. While further research is needed, this may indicate 
that believing in one’s control is not sufficient – that self-regulation is also critical. 
References
Bachrach, Christine A., Jennifer Johnson-Hanks, Hans-Peter Kohler and S. Philip 
Morgan. 2007. “A Theory of Conjunctural Action.” Paper given at the Conference 
on Preliminary Recommendations and Commentary on Explaining Family Change 
and Diversity, June 7-8, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Bachrach, Christine A., and Susan Newcomer. 1999. “Intended Pregnancies and 
Unintended Pregnancies: Distinct Categories or Opposite Ends of a Continuum?” 
Family Planning Perspectives 31(5):251-52.
Barber, Jennifer S., and Patricia L. East. 2009. “Home and Parenting Resources Available 
to Siblings Depending on Their Birth Intention Status.” Child Development 
80(3):921-39.
Barber, Jennifer S., William G. Axinn and Arland Thornton. 1999. “Unwanted 
Childbearing, Health, and Mother-Child Relationships.” Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior 40(3):231-57.
Baydar, Nazli. 1995. “Consequences for Children of their Birth Planning Status.” Family 
Planning Perspectives 27(6):228-34, 245.
Becker, Gary S. 1960. “An Economic Analysis of Fertility.” Pp. 209-40. Demographic and 
Economic Change in Developed Countries. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
editors. Princeton University Press.
______. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press.
Blake, Judith. 1967. “Income and Reproductive Motivation.” Population Studies 
21(3):185-206.
______. 1968. “Are Babies Consumer Durables? A Critique of the Economic Theory of 
Reproductive Motivation.” Population Studies 22(1):5-25.
Blake, Judith, and Prithwis Das Gupta. 1975. “Reproductive Motivation Versus 
Contraceptive Technology: Is Recent American Experience an Exception?” Population 
and Development Review 1(2):229-49. 
Boonstra, Heather D., Rachel Benson Gold, Cory L. Richards and Lawrence B. Finer. 
2006. Abortion in Women’s Lives. New York: Guttmacher Institute. 566  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
Brown, Sarah S., and Leon Eisenberg. 1995. The Best Intentions: Unintended Pregnancy 
and the Well-being of Children and Families. National Academy Press.
Bumpass, Larry L. 1987. “The Risk of an Unwanted Birth: The Changing Context of 
Contraceptive Sterilization in the U.S.” Population Studies 41(3):347-63.
Butz, William P., and Michael P. Ward. 1979. “The Emergence of Countercyclical U.S. 
Fertility.” American Economic Review 69(3):318-28.
Crissey, Sarah R. 2005. “Effect of Pregnancy Intention on Child Well-Being and 
Development: Combining Retrospective Reports of Attitude and Contraceptive 
Use.” Population Research and Policy Review 24(6):593-615.
Edin, Kathryn, and Maria Kefalas. 2005. Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put 
Motherhood Before Marriage. University of California Press.
Edin, Kathryn, Paula England, Emily Fitzgibbons Shafer and Joanna Reed. 2007. 
“Forming Fragile Families: Was the Baby Planned, Unplanned, or In Between?” Pp. 
25-54. Unmarried Couples with Children. Paula England and Kathryn Edin, editors. 
Russell Sage Foundation.
Ellwood, David T., and Christopher Jencks. 2004. “The Spread of Single-Parent Families in 
the United States Since 1960.” Pp. 25-65. The Future of the Family. Daniel P. Moynihan, 
Timothy M. Smeeding and Lee Rainwater, editors. Russell Sage Foundation.
England, Paula, and Kathryn Edin. 2007. Unmarried Couples with Children. Russell Sage 
Foundation.
Finer, Lawrence B., and Stanley K. Henshaw. 2006. “Disparities in Rates of Unintended 
Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001.” Perspectives on Sexual and 
Reproductive Health 38(2):90-96.
Freedman, Ronald, Pascal K. Whelpton and Arthur A. Campbell. 1959. Family Planning, 
Sterility and Population Growth. McGraw Hill.
Goldstein, Joshua R., and Catherine T. Kenney. 2001. “Marriage Delayed or Marriage 
Forgone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriage for U.S. Women.” American 
Sociological Review 66(4):506-19.
Hamilton, Brady E., Joyce A. Martin and Stephanie J. Ventura. 2009. Births: Preliminary 
Data for 2007. National Vital Statistics Reports 57(12). Released March 18. Available 
at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_12.pdf.
Hays, Sharon. 1996. The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood. Yale University Press.
Heckman, James J., and James R. Walker. 1990. “The Relationship Between Wages and 
Income and the Timing and Spacing of Births: Evidence form Swedish Longitudinal 
Data.” Econometrica 58(6):1411-41.
Hotz, V. Joseph, Jacob Alex Klerman and Robert J. Willis. 1997. “The Economics of 
Fertility in Developed Countries.” Pp. 275-342. Handbook of Population and Family 
Economics. Mark R. Rosenzweig and Oded Stark, editors. North-Holland Elsevier Press.
Heuveline, Patrick, Jeffrey M. Timberlake and Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. 2003. “Shifting 
Child Rearing to Single Mothers: Results from 17 Western Nations.” Population and 
Development Review 29(1):47-71.
Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer. 2005. “When the Future Decides: Uncertainty and Intentional 
Action in Contemporary Cameroon.” Current Anthropology 46(3):363-85.
Joshi, Heather. 2002. “Production, Reproduction, and Education: Women, Children, and 
Work in a British Perspective.” Population And Development Review 28(3):445-74.Education Differences in Fertility  • 567
Joyce, Theodore J., Robert Kaestner and Sanders Korenman. 2000. “The Effect of 
Pregnancy Intention on Child Development.” Demography 37(1):83-94.
Kane, Emily W. 1995. “Education and Beliefs about Gender Inequality.” Social Problems 
42(1):74-90.
Kiecolt, K. Jill, and Alan C. Acock. 1988. “The Long-Term Effects of Family Structure on 
Gender-Role Attitudes.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 50(3):709-17.
Kiernan, Kathleen. 2002. “Cohabitation in Western Europe: Trends, Issues, and 
Implications.” Pp. 3-31. Just Living Together: Implications of Cohabitation on Families, 
Children and Social Policy. Alan Booth and Ann C. Crouter, editors. Lawrence 
Arlbaum Associates.
Lareau, Annette. 2003. Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life. University of 
California Press.
Macunovich, Diane J. 1996. “Relative Income and Price of Time: Exploring Their Effects 
on U.S. Fertility and Female Labor Force Participation.” Population and Development 
Review 22(Supplement):223-57.
Martin,  Steven  P.  2000.  “Diverging  Fertility  Among  U.S. Women Who  Delay 
Childbearing Past Age 30.” Demography 37(4):523-33.
______. 2006. “Trends in Marital Dissolution by Women’s Education in the United 
States.” Demographic Research 15(20):537-60.
McLanahan, Sara. 2004. “Diverging Destinies: How Children Fare Under the Second 
Demographic Transition.” Demography 41(4):607-27.
Miller, Warren B. 1986. “Why Some Women Fail to Use their Contraceptive Method: A 
Psychological Investigation.” Family Planning Perspectives 18(1):27-32.
Mincer, Jacob. 1963. “Market Prices, Opportunity Costs and Income Effects.” Pp. 66-82. 
Measurement in Economics: Studies in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Yehuda 
Grunfield. Carl Christ, editor. Stanford University Press.
Mirowsky, John, and Catherine E. Ross. 2007. “Life Course Trajectories of Perceived 
Control and their Relationship to Education.” American Journal of Sociology 
112(5):1339-82.
Morgan, S. Philip. 1996. “Characteristic Features of Modern American Fertility.” 
Population and Development Review 22(Supplement):19-63.
Morgan, S. Philip, and Allan Parnell. 2002. “Effects on Pregnancy Outcomes of Changes 
in the North Carolina State Abortion Fund,” Population Research and Policy Review 
21(4):319-38.
Morris, Martina, and Bruce Western 1999. “Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century.” Annual Review of Sociology 25:623-57.
Pollak, Robert A., and Susan C. Watkins. 1993. “Cultural and Economic Approaches 
to Fertility: Proper Marriage or Mésalliance?” Population and Development Review 
19(3):467-96.
Pratt, William F., William D. Mosher, Christine A. Bachrach and Marjorie C. Horn. 
1984. “Understanding U.S. Fertility: Findings from the National Survey of Family 
Growth, Cycle III.” Population Reference Bureau 38(5):3-42.
Rainwater, Lee. 1960. And the Poor Get Children: Sex, Contraception, and Family Planning 
in the Working Class. Quadrangle.
Raley, R. Kelly, and Larry L. Bumpass. 2003. “The Topography of the Plateau in Divorce: 
Levels and Trends in Union Stability after 1980.” Demographic Research 8(8):245-58. 568  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
Rendall, Michael S., Lynda Clarke, H. Elizabeth Peters, Nalini Ranjit and Georgia 
Verropoulou. 1999. “Incomplete Reporting of Men’s Fertility in the United States 
and Britain: A Research Note.” Demography 36(1):135-44.
Rindfuss, Ronald R., S. Philip Morgan and Kate Offutt. 1996. “Education and the 
Changing Age Pattern of American Fertility: 1963-1989.” Demography 33(3):277-90.
Ross, Catherine, and John Mirowsky. 2003. Education, Social Status, and Health. Aldine 
de Gruyter. 
Ryder, Norman B. 1973a. “A Critique of the National Fertility Survey.” Demography 
10(4):495-505.
______. 1973b. “Recent Trends and Group Differences in Fertility.” Pp. 57-68. Toward 
the End of Growth. Charles F. Westoff, editor. Prentice-Hall.
Quesnel-Vallee, Amelie, and S. Philip Morgan. 2003. “Missing the Target? Correspondence 
of Fertility Intentions and Behavior in the U.S.” Population Research and Policy Review 
22(5-6):497-525.
Sayer, Liana, Nathan Wright and Kathryn Edin. 2003. “Class Differences in Family 
Attitudes.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, 
Minneapolis, MN, May 1-3.
Schultz, T. Paul. 1994. “Marital Status and Fertility in the United States: Welfare and 
Labor Market Effects.” Journal of Human Resources 29(2):637-69.
Schwartz, Christine R., and Robert D. Mare. 2005. “Trends in Educational Assortative 
Marriage from 1940 to 2003.” Demography 42(4):621-46.
Silverman, Jane, Aida Torres and Jacqueline Darroch Forrest. 1987. “Barriers to 
Contraceptive Services.” Family Planning Perspectives 19(3):94-97.
Sweet, James A., and Ronald R. Rindfuss. 1983 “Those Ubiquitous Fertility Trends: 
United States, 1945-1979.” Social Biology 30(2):127-39. 
Trussell, James, Barbara Vaughan and Joseph Stanford. 1999. “Are All Contraceptive 
Failures Unintended Pregnancies? Evidence from the 1995 National Survey of Family 
Growth.” Family Planning Perspectives 31(5):246-47, 260.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2006. NLSY79 User’s Guide. Available at: http://www.
nlsinfo.org/nlsy79/docs/79html/79text/front.htm.
Westoff, Charles F. 1972. “The Modernization of Contraceptive Practice.” Family Planning 
Perspectives 4(2):9-12.
Westoff, Charles F., and Akinrinola Bankole. 1996. “The Potential Demographic 
Significance of Unmet Need.” International Family Planning Perspectives 22(1):16-20.
Williams, Lindy B., Joyce Abma and Linda J. Piccinino. 1999. “The Correspondence 
Between Intention to Avoid Childbearing and Subsequent Fertility: A Prospective 
Analysis. Family Planning Perspectives 31(5):220-27.
Wu, Lawrence L., and Kelly Musick. 2008. “Stability of Marital and Cohabiting Unions 
Following a First Birth.” Population Research and Policy Review 27(6):713-27.
Xie, Yu, James Raymo, Kimberly Goyette and Arland Thornton. 2003. “Economic 
Potential and Entry into Marriage and Cohabitation.” Demography 40(2):351-67.
Yang, Yang, and S. Philip Morgan. 2003. “How Big Are Educational and Racial Fertility 
Differentials in the U.S.?” Social Biology 50(3/4):167-87.
Zabin, Laurie Schwab, George R. Huggins, Mark R. Emerson and Vanessa E. Cullins. 
2000. “Partner Effects on a Woman’s Intention to Conceive: ‘Not with This Partner.’” 
Family Planning Perspectives 32(1):39-45. Education Differences in Fertility  • 569
Appendix 1a. Time-Invariant Sample Characteristics
Whites Blacks
Childbearing Desires in 1979 – All Women 2.57 2.33
Childbearing Desires in 1979 – by Final Education
, High school 2.40 2.02
High school 2.53 2.26
Some college 2.64 2.34
College 2.61 2.68
Variables in Predicted Education Regressions
Educational expectations in 1979 13.98 13.94
Standardized scores on AFQT .55 -.54
Mother's education 11.96 10.81
Father's education 12.18 10.40
Parents' income in 1979 24,159 12,203
Lived with both parents until age 14 .80 .49
Total Sample Size Pooled Over Person-Years 48,930 27,651
Notes: Means are weighted and Ns are unweighted. Characteristics are shown for 
our analysis sample, pooled over all person-years.570  •  Social Forces 88(2) 
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